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This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Industrial 
Organisation, Competitive Strategy and Business Performance.Abstract 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) provides the statutory 
framework for the new UK market abuse regime, which became effective on 1 
December 2001.  The FSMA market abuse regime provides new powers to the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) to sanction anyone who engages in ‘market 
abuse’, that is misuse of information, misleading practices, and market 
manipulation, relating to investments traded on prescribed UK markets.  It also 
applies to those who require or encourage others to engage in conduct that would 
amount to market abuse.  FSMA’s stated objective is to fill the ‘regulatory gap’ by 
giving the FSA substantial powers to punish unregulated market participants 
whose market conduct falls below acceptable standards, but does not rise to the 
level of a criminal offence.  This paper analyses the major features of both the UK 
insider dealing legislation contained in Part V of the Criminal Justice 1993, the 
FSMA market abuse regime contained in section 118 of the Act, and the proposed 
European Union Directive on Market Abuse that represents a significant level of 
convergence in European securities regulation.  The paper argues that an efficient 
price discovery process for securities markets can be facilitated only by a 
comprehensive regulatory regime that provides substantive standards and rules that 
ensure high standards of transparency and disclosure through effective 
enforcement.    
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1. Introduction   
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) provides the 
statutory framework for the new UK market abuse regime, which 
became effective on 1 December 2001. The FSMA market abuse regime 
provides new powers to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to 
sanction anyone who engages in ‘market abuse’, that is misuse of 
information, misleading practices, and market manipulation, relating to 
investments traded on prescribed UK markets. It also applies to those 
who require or encourage others to engage in conduct that would amount 
to market abuse. FSMA’s stated objective is to fill the ‘regulatory gap’ 
by giving the FSA substantial powers to punish unregulated market 
participants whose market conduct falls below acceptable standards, but 
does not rise to the level of a criminal offence.  Moreover, the FSA has 
powers to regulate and discipline issuers of UK listed securities and their 
directors, and additional powers to impose fines for breaches of UK 
listing rules. The Market Abuse regime overlaps with, and extends 
beyond, the FSA’s principles for business and statements of principles 
for approved persons and the disciplinary powers of other agencies such 
as the exchanges and the Takeover Panel.   
 
The FSMA market abuse regime expands upon the criminal offence of 
insider dealing as set forth in Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 by 
creating a far-reaching civil offence of market abuse for which unlimited 
fines can be imposed. Section 118 defines market abuse as ‘behaviour 
(whether action or inaction) which is likely to be regarded by a regular 
user of the market who is aware of the behaviour as a failure on the part 
of the person or persons concerned to observe the standards of behaviour 
reasonably expected of a person in his or their position in relation to the 
market’.
1 The civil offence of market abuse is significant because it 
seeks to regulate market behaviour according to its impact on the 
market, and places less emphasis on the individual motivation of the 




This paper analyses the major features of both the UK insider dealing 
legislation contained in Part V of the Criminal Justice 1993 and the 
FSMA market abuse regime contained primarily in section 118 of the 
Act. The paper addresses three areas. First, the existing UK legislation 
that makes insider dealing a criminal offence will be analysed with the 
suggestion that its narrow application to cases of misuse of information 
either to gain a profit or avoid loss, its strictly territorial focus, and 
criminal evidentiary standard make it an ineffective regulatory tool to 
police market abuse in modern financial markets.  Second, the FSMA 
Market Abuse regime defines market abuse broadly to include not only 
misuse of insider information but also various forms of market 
manipulation. The criminal offence of market manipulation under 
section 47 of the Financial Services Act 1986 has been replaced by 
section 397 of FSMA that makes misleading statements and misleading 
practices a criminal offence. Third, the proposed European Union 
Directive on Market Manipulation contains prohibitions on market abuse 
that are similar to UK insider dealing law and to FSMA’s market abuse 
provisions. Although it appears to adopt a broader definition of market 
manipulation than what is provided under the UK law, the proposed 
Directive represents a significant level of convergence in the European 
Community regarding the recognition of the need to combat market 
abuse in EU financial markets.   
  
2. Background To UK Insider Dealing Law 
 
In the United Kingdom, insider dealing can be defined as trading in 
organised securities markets by persons in possession of material non-
public information, and has been recognised as a widespread problem 
that is extremely difficult to eradicate. Some of the insider dealing is 
based on corporate information, that is, information about a company’s 
finances or operations. In recent years, however, most of the important 
dealing cases have concerned mergers and acquisitions, due largely to 
the explosive growth in takeover activity during the past decade.  The 
community of bankers, lawyers, public relations advisors, and others 
  
  
who receive advance knowledge of proposed takeovers, which 
invariably occur at a substantial premium over the existing market price 
of the acquired company’s shares, face a strong temptation to make a 
quick profit from inside information. 
 
The general criminal law has always sought to protect the integrity of 
public markets.
2  For example, section 47 of the Financial Services Act 
1986 outlawed misleading statements and manipulative practices as 
unlawful interference with the proper operation of the markets.
3  
Moreover, the crime of conspiracy to defraud was utilised to police the 
markets.  In practice, however, these more general offences relating to 
interference with the market would not be applicable in cases of simple 
insider dealing, unless there had been manipulation and fraudulent 
conduct.  
 
Until 1980, the restrictions on insider dealing in the United Kingdom 
were extremely limited.  There was no statutory prohibition of the 
practice, nor did the common law make insider dealing actionable.
4  In 
the leading case of Percival v. Wright,
5 the Court of Chancery held that a 
corporate director owed a fiduciary duty only to the company and not to 
its individual shareholders, and that therefore the director was ordinarily 
not obliged to disclose information about the company to the 
shareholders before trading with them. Nevertheless, if a director 
expressly or impliedly becomes an agent for one or more shareholders in 
a particular transaction, the fiduciary duties arising out of the agency 
relationship may prevent him from realising a profit on the acquisition of 
securities to his own advantage. Although the City Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers
6 and the London Stock Exchange
7 had adopted rules and 
guidelines that restricted insider dealing and the ‘tipping’ of inside 
information, these requirements were never strictly enforced.







3. Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 
 
After two unsuccessful legislative attempts to outlaw insider dealing in 
the 1970s,
9 Parliament in 1980 amended the Companies Act to make 
insider dealing a criminal offence.
10  These provisions outlawing insider 
dealing were consolidated in 1985 when the Companies Act was revised.  
The insider dealing provisions of the Companies Act 1985 became 
known as the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.
11  These 
provisions were supplemented in 1986 by provisions in the Financial 
Services Act that strengthened the government’s enforcement powers.
12   
 
The Insider Dealing Act 1985 prohibited persons who had access to 
material non-public information by virtue of their position with a 
company (including directors, officers, employees, and various kinds of 
agents of the company) from trading in the securities of the company 
while in possession of such information. These insiders were also 
prohibited from making selective disclosure of such information to 
others (‘tipping’); and it prohibited their tippees from trading on basis of 
such inside information.  The Act also prohibited persons in possession 
of non-public information about a proposed takeover of a company from 
trading in that company’s stock.       
     
The 1985 Insider Dealing Act established only criminal liability, and its 
prohibitions applied only to individuals who acted while knowingly in 
possession of inside information. Although the Insider Dealing Act was 
an important step in outlawing the offence of insider dealing, the scope 
and impact of the British legislation was rather narrow.  In fact, despite 
the fact that insider dealing had been an offence since 1980, there were 








4. Criminal Justice Act 1993, Part V 
   
The Criminal Justice Act 1993 (‘CJA 1993’)
13 replaced the Company 
Securities Act (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 and represented an extension 
of the basis of liability for the insider dealing offence. The CJA 1993 
contains a wider definition of ‘securities’ and ‘insider’ than the 1985 Act 
and the nature of the inside information necessary to impose liability has 
been altered.       
    
Part V of the CJA 1993 provides for the offence of insider dealing that 
seeks to prevent individuals from engaging in three classes of conduct in 
particular circumstances. First, the Act prohibits dealing in price-
affected securities on the basis of inside information. Second, it prohibits 
the encouragement of another person to deal in price-affected securities 
on the basis of insider information; and, third, it prohibits knowing 
disclosure of insider information to another.
14 To prove an offence under 
section 52, it was necessary to demonstrate two elements: (a) the status 
of the person charged as an insider, and (b) the type of information in its 
possession to be inside information. Section 52 provides in relevant part: 
 
‘(1) An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of 
insider dealing if, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection 
(3), he deals in securities that are price- affected securities in 
relation to the information. 
 
(2) An individual who has information as an insider is also guilty 
of insider dealing if – 
(a)    he encourages another person to deal in securities that are 
(whether or not that other knows it) price-affected securities in 
relation to the information, knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that the dealing would take place in the circumstances 
mentioned in subsection (3); or  
  
  
(b) he discloses information, otherwise than in proper performance 
of the functions of his employment, office or profession, to another 
person. 
 
(3) The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or 
disposal in question occurs on a regulated market, or that the 
person dealing relies on a professional intermediary or is himself 
acting as a professional intermediary.’ 
  
Criminal liability for each offence may only attach to an individual, 
because the term ‘individual’ is defined to exclude corporations and 
other entities (eg. public authorities). The definition of individual did 
cover, however, unincorporated partnerships or firms comprising a 
collection of individuals. Although these offences could apply to certain 
business entities, it was a major weakness of the legislation that it did 
not apply to corporations. To this extent, the UK law was not in 
compliance with the 1989 European Community Insider Dealing 
Directive,
15 which applies to both natural and legal persons. The Market 
Abuse regime under FSMA remedies this gap, in part, by making the 
offence of market abuse applicable to most legal entities (including 




To commit the offence of insider dealing, an individual must have 
information ‘as an insider’, which is defined in section 57 as follows: 
 
‘(1) . . .a person has information as an insider if and only if 
(a) it is, and he knows that it is, inside information, and 







(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person has information 
from an inside source if and only if – 
(a)   he has it through 
(i)    being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of 
securities; or 
(ii) having access to the information by virtue of his employment, 
office or profession; or 
(b)  the direct or indirect source of his information is a person 
within paragraph (a).’ 
 
The CJA 1993, s. 57 created a distinction between a primary insider (a 
person who has direct knowledge of inside information) and a secondary 
insider (a person who learns inside information from an inside source).  
The primary insider usually obtains inside information through being a 
director, employee, or shareholder of an issuer of securities or any 
person who has information because of his employment or office. A 
secondary insider obtains inside information either directly or indirectly 
from a primary insider. Section 57 would impose liability on brokers or 
analysts as secondary insiders if they act on ‘market intelligence’ that 
comes from a primary insider.  
 
The insider dealing offence, only in so far as dealing and encouragement 
are concerned, could only be committed if the acquisition or disposal of 
securities occurs on a regulated market, or if the person dealing relied on 
a professional intermediary or is himself a professional intermediary.
16  
The CJA 1993 defines professional intermediary as a person who carries 
on a business of acquiring or disposing of securities (whether as 
principal or agent) or a business of acting as an intermediary between 
persons taking part in any dealing in securities.
17 An individual 
employed by such a person to carry out these activities are also defined 
as  professional intermediaries. The definition of professional 
intermediary does not include a person whose activities are merely 
incidental to other activities or if those activities are only conducted 
occasionally.
18   
  
  
6. The Encouragement Offence 
   
The encouragement offence is found in section 52(2)(a) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1993 (CJA 1993) and it prohibits a person from encouraging 
another person to deal in securities based on knowing or having 
reasonable cause to believe that the person receiving the encouragement 
would deal in securities in the circumstances covered by the dealing 
offence.
19 It is not a requirement of the offence for the individual who 
has information as an insider to pass information to the other person, nor 
is it necessary that the other person should know that the securities it is 
encouraged to buy are price-affected securities. The offence covers the 
classic situation where a tip is given by an insider to another to sell, for 
example, ‘as many shares of Marconi as you can before tomorrow’s 
profit report’. Naturally, this could occur in a number of other situations. 
 
If the insider knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the other 
person will deal on a regulated market or through a professional 
intermediary the offence will be committed even if, in fact, the other 
person does not undertake an insider dealing transaction. In practice, 
however, a successful criminal prosecution will likely require a deal or 
transaction to ensure a conviction. A deal in securities is relevant not 
only to the dealing offence but also to the encouragement offence insofar 
as the encouragement has to be targeted at a particular transaction.   
Although not of direct relevance to the form of the disclosure offence, a 
defence is available where no dealing was expected.
20 This is because 
the type of dealing with which the CJA 1993 is concerned is limited. 
21 
 
The encouragement offence can also create intermediary liability. For 
example, if deals in securities do not occur on a recognised investment 
exchange, they will only be within the insider dealing legislation if the 
person dealing relies on a professional intermediary or is himself a 
professional intermediary. A person will rely on a professional 
intermediary only if the professional intermediary either acquires or 
disposes of securities (whether as principal or agent) in relation to the 
  
  
dealing or acts as intermediary between persons taking part in the 
dealing.
22 Therefore, if the securities dealt in fall within the above 
categories, the insider dealing offence will be relevant unless the 
transaction is truly a private deal off the market without the intervention 
of a market professional.
23 
 
Under this definition, a person will rely on a professional intermediary 
only if the professional intermediary either acquires or disposes of 
securities (whether as principal or agent) in relation to the dealing or 
acts as intermediary between persons taking part in the dealing.
24  If 
deals in securities do occur on a regulated market (i.e., investment 
exchange), the insider dealing offence will be relevant unless the 
transaction is truly a private deal off the market without the intervention 
of a market professional. 
 
In addition, the offence of insider dealing cannot apply to anything done 
by an individual acting on behalf of a public sector body in pursuit of the 
government’s economic policies (e.g. managing monetary policy 
through the adjustment of exchange rates, interest rates, or the public 
debt or foreign exchange reserves).
25  The purpose of these exclusions is 
to permit government policymakers to have sufficient discretion to 
manage the economy in the public interest.  These exclusions, however, 
would not apply to the government’s sale of shares in a privatisation.   
 
7. The Elements of the Dealing Offence 
 
The two essential requirements for the dealing offence are that: (a) an 
individual must have information as an insider; and (b) the insider must 
deal in securities that are price-affected securities in relation to the 
information.
26 With respect to inside information, the prices of price-
affected securities will likely be significantly affected if information 
related to such securities is made public.
27  Accordingly, if an insider has 
inside information he must not deal in the securities to which that 
information relates.  The CJA 1993 adopts a broad definition of ‘dealing 
  
  
in securities’ to cover any acquisition or disposal of a security, including 
an agreement to acquire or dispose of a security and the entering into a 
contract which creates the security or the bringing to an end of such 
contract.
28 Moreover, such acquisitions or disposals are within the 
definition irrespective of whether they are made by an individual as 
principal or as agent.    
 
The securities to which the Act applies are price-affected securities 
which are defined in Schedule 2.  They include shares and debentures in 
companies as well as their derivatives.  They also include gilts and local 
authority stock (even of foreign public bodies) and their derivatives.   
Contractual rights of differences (e.g., derivatives) are also included.
29  
The list conforms to the EC Directive on Insider Dealing,
30 so that not 
only corporate securities and instruments based on such securities are 
included but also that other contractual rights in other futures and 
derivatives markets are covered. 
 
The relevant time at which to consider whether or not an offence has 
been committed would appear to be at the time of agreement to acquire 
or dispose of the security. At that time, if the individual had inside 
information about these securities he will have committed an offence.  
However, if he received inside information only after making the 
agreement he will probably not have violated the provision if he 
completes the deal and actually acquires or disposes of the securities.
31  
On the other hand, if the individual had the inside information at the 
time when he agreed to acquire or dispose of the security it would seem 
that he will still have committed an offence, even if he does not 
complete the bargain.     
 
The acquisition or disposal may be made by an individual acting either 
as principal or agent. Accordingly, if an agent has inside information, he 
will be within the scope of the offence if he deals in the relevant 
securities even though, in a direct sense, he will not gain from the 
transaction. This has special relevance to a trader who is engaged in a 
  
  
transaction as agent to benefit his principal. The fact that the individual 
deals as agent and not principal is irrelevant. However, where the agent 
deals on an execution basis only, such an approach hardly seems 
justified and is unfair to the principal who gave the instruction if the 
agent then feels inhibited from processing the order. Fortunately, it 
appears that a defence in this situation would allow the agent to act on 
instructions notwithstanding that, incidentally, he has inside 
information.
32     
  
A person is also regarded as dealing in securities if he procures, directly 
or indirectly, an acquisition or disposal of the securities by another 
person.
33 Such procurement may occur in a number of ways including 
where the person who actually acquires or disposes of the security is 
acting as an agent, nominee or at the direction of another in relation to 
the acquisition or disposal of a security.
34 This aspect of the definition of 
‘dealing in securities’ is designed to cover transactions through an agent 
or nominee where the principal has relied on inside information without 
purchasing or selling the securities himself. Transactions are also 
covered that are undertaken at the direction of a sole shareholder who 
uses its influence over a company to deal in its shares.
35 
 
The broad scope of the procurement prohibition was recognised in 
debates in the House of Commons Standing Committee during passage 
of the Criminal Justice Bill in which the phrase ‘a person who is acting 
at his direction’ may likely result in liability for a principal who has 
inside information but whose investment portfolio is handled by 
someone else on a discretionary basis. For example, this might occur in 
the case of a fund manager who had the authority to deal in a 
discretionary manner in securities to which his principal’s insider 
information relates, thus resulting in liability for the principal, despite 






The Government’s Economic Secretary responded by stating that whilst 
it was possible for a person who had transferred its holdings of a 
portfolio to an investment manager to be exposed to liability as a 
procurer, ‘it may well be that’
36 a person who gives a general direction 
to another to manage its affairs would not be considered to have directed 
and, therefore, to have procured dealings in securities which was 
undertaken by the person with responsibility for managing the fund.   
Moreover, the Minister stated that in cases where there were 
circumstances to suggest that a person had procured a transaction, the 
holder of the shares would have a statutory defence if the holder had not 
genuinely influenced the dealing.
37  
 
8. The Characteristics of Insider Information        
 
Each of the three offences provided for in the CJA 1993 requires that 
insider information be an essential element of the offence.   
Commentators have acknowledge, however, that notwithstanding the 
statutory definition, inside information is a difficult concept to define in 
practice. For example, at any one time, a substantial amount of 
information will be generated within a company and be available to its 
directors, employees, and advisers.  Much of this information will be 
confidential, and may have some impact on share prices.  Generally, 
insider dealing law should not be concerned with this type of 
information, but rather it should focus on information that is essentially 
extraordinary in nature and which is reasonably certain to have a 
substantial impact on the market price of securities.
38  Indeed, during 
debate over the original UK insider dealing law, ministers acknowledged 
that the kind of knowledge they were concerned with was that of 









The CJA 1993 assesses the quality of information to determine whether 
it is inside information by use of criteria that seek to ascertain whether or 
not information has a ‘significant effect’ on the market price of the 
security.  The CJA 1993 defines inside information by reference to four 
characteristics as provided in section 56:  
 
CJA 1993, s. 56 defines inside information as follows: 
 
  ‘(1) . . . inside information means information which— 
 
(a)    relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of 
securities 
or to particular issuers of securities and not to securities 
generally 
or to issuers of securities generally; 
(b) is specific or precise; 
(c)   has not been made public; and 
(d) if it were made public would be likely to have a significant 
effect on the price of any securities. 
 
  (2) . . . securities are ‘price-affected securities’ in relation to inside 
information, and inside information is ‘price-sensitive information’ 
in relation to securities, if and only if the information would, if 
made public, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
the securities’.
40     
 
It is important to note that the FSMA has adopted this meaning of the 
term ‘inside information.’  The characteristics and elements of inside 
information are such that they should cover information which relates to 
a specific sector as well as to a specific security, while excluding general 
information.  Under FSMA, general information has been defined as 
information which can be obtained by research or analysis conducted by 
or on behalf of users of a market.
41 
   
  
  
9. ‘Made Public’ 
 
For purposes of defining inside information under section 56 another 
characteristic of it is that it has not been made public.
42  Under section 
58(2) & (3), Inside information is made public or is to be treated as 
made public in the following circumstances:  
 
(a) if the information is published in accordance with the rules of a 
regulated market for the purpose of informing investors and 
their professional advisors; 
(b)  if the information is contained in records which, by virtue of 
any enactment are given to inspection by the public; 
(c) if the information can be readily acquired by those likely to deal 
in any securities to which the information relates or of an issuer 
to which the information relates; or 
(d)  if the information is derived from information which has been 
made public. 
 
In addition, the CJA 1993 provides five circumstances when information 
may be treated as having been made public, even though it has not.
43   
 
These are where information:  
 
(a)    can be acquired only by persons exercising diligence or 
expertise; 
(b) is communicated to a section of the public and not to the public 
at large; 
(c)   can be acquired only by observation; 
(d) communicated only on payment of a fee; or 
(e)   is published only outside the UK.
44 
 
The above definitions state that information may be treated as public, 
even though further efforts have to be made to obtain the information.  
This accords with the broad scope of the definition of ‘made public’ in 
  
  
the EC Directive 89/592, which provides that information derived from 
publicly available data cannot be regarded as inside information and any 
transaction executed on the basis of such information would not 
constitute insider dealing under the broad definition of the Directive. 
  
10. Information published according to the rules of a regulated 
market      
 
Publication of insider information will not necessarily deprive insiders 
of their advantages because markets often take time to absorb 
information.  It is generally accepted in financial markets that prices of 
securities do not always adjust immediately upon the release of material 
information.  Accordingly, US securities law recognises this market 
reality by imposing liability on insiders for transactions undertaken 
before the market has assimilated the information.
45  Similarly, before 
the CJA 1993, the UK Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 
probably would have prohibited insiders from immediately dealing on 
insider information after announcement until prices had adjusted to the 
information.  The insiders were thus required to wait for the market to 
assimilate the information.  The EC Directive on Insider Dealing has 
also been given this interpretation.
46 
 
The 1993 CJA clarifies the procedure for insiders to know when they 
can trade on information just released to the market.  It adopts a 
procedure for notifying information to The Stock Exchange
47 that 
contains the following requirements.  The information which issuers 
wish to release to the public must be delivered in the form of an 
announcement to the Company Announcements Office.  The Stock 
Exchange then arranges for the prompt publication of announcements 
through its Regulatory News Service.  At this point, for example, there 
could be an announcement on TOPIC that the information will be ‘made 




In recent years, the Regulatory News Service operates between 7.30 am 
and 6.00 pm and announcements notified up until 5.30 pm are released 
on the day of receipt. The FSA Listing Rules provide that no information 
may be released to a third party before such information is released to 
the Company Announcements Office. If announcements are made 
outside the operational hours of the Regulatory News Service, however, 
the information must be given to two or more UK national newspapers 
and to two news services to ensure adequate coverage. This information 
must also be lodged with the Company Announcements Office no later 
than it is given to the other parties. In these circumstances, the 
information would appear to have been made public on publication of 
the newspapers.        
 
11. Information contained in public records   
 
Information will be regarded as being made public if it is contained on 
records which, by virtue of any enactment, are open to inspection by the 
public. This covers registers set up under the statute, such as companies’ 
or patents’ registers or in publications such as the Official Gazette.
48 
 
Information is considered ‘public’ when it can readily be acquired by 
those likely to deal in any securities to which or to whose issuer the 
information relates.
49 The phrase ‘likely to deal’ in securities is a term of 
art having its origin in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 
1985, which defined it as ‘unpublished price-sensitive information’.
50 
Although it could be argued that the phrase only embraces the market 
professionals who deal in securities, such as market makers who are 
clearly ‘likely to deal’, it is also possible that it refers to the market in 
the shares itself. If information can readily be acquired by the market, 
that information is already likely to have made its price impact and is, 
therefore, not properly to be regarded as inside information.  Thus, it is 





12. Information derived from information made public     
 
Information is considered public if it originates from information which 
has been ‘made public’.
51 Although this may seem obvious, expert 
analysis of information may still have regard to many other factors, 
including the exposure of facts that had not been in the public domain.   
The CJA 1993 addresses the problem posed by an analyst who has 
knowledge of the company and industry and who can put together 
seemingly inconsequential data with public information into a mosaic 
which reveals material non-public information. Whenever managers, 
advisers and analysts meet in non-public places, there will be a risk that 
the analysts will take away knowledge of material information which is 
not publicly available. This should not be a violation of UK law so long 
as the mosaic, which contains inside information, is derived from 
information which has been made public.   
 
13. Price Sensitivity 
 
The final aspect of the definition of ‘insider information’ is the price 
sensitivity of the information. The test is that if the information was 
made public it would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
securities.  This is the most essential feature of the statutory definition of 
inside information. This criterion, rather than the issue of how 
qualitative the information actually is, which really matters and which, 
ultimately, will be the determining factor when a jury considers whether 
information is inside information. 
 
Price sensitivity can only be determined at the moment of the deal when, 
by definition, the information is not known to the public and can have no 







14. Territorial Scope of the Offence 
 
The jurisdictional provisions of the CJA are contained in section 62, 
which requires that some element of the offence under section 52(1) or 
(2) must take place in the United Kingdom or the dealing was on a UK 
regulated market, or the broker or investment firm was carrying on 
business in the UK. The statute is narrowly aimed at insider dealing that 
takes place in the United Kingdom, and will not apply if an essential 
element of the offence takes place outside UK territory.
52 
 
The prohibitions contained in these provisions are subject to territorial 
restrictions, though the restriction ‘regulated markets’ included all of the 
major stock markets of the European Community and any other 
designated by order.
53 It is important to note, however, that purely 
private deals, even involving securities covered by the CJA, fell outside 
the scope of the offence. By contrast, the FSMA market abuse regime 
covers both transactions by regulated persons and dealing by private 
persons off regulated exchanges.   
 
Generally, an offence will be committed under the following 
circumstances: if the insider is in the United Kingdom when he deals, or 
when the dealing takes place on a UK-regulated market, which operates 
in the United Kingdom, or if the person dealing in the price-affected 
securities relies on a professional intermediary on a regulated UK 
market or is himself a professional intermediary.  
 
By contrast, the FSMA will have extraterritorial reach.  It applies to 
misleading practices and manipulative conduct outside the UK that 
might have an effect on UK markets. In relation to misuse of 
information, it is not necessary to show any nexus with the UK at all, 
other than that the behaviour relates to a UK traded investment in the 
broad sense described below. It will not necessarily be a defence for a 
person in a foreign jurisdiction to plead that they have conformed with 
the rules or standards of a local jurisdiction. This expansive application 
  
  
of jurisdiction enables the UK authorities to regulate activity that takes 
place in a foreign jurisdiction that affects UK financial markets.    
 
15. The Financial Services and Markets Act: The Market Abuse 
Regime  
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1993 imposes criminal liability for insider 
dealing, but did not provide a civil remedy for the company or 
unsuspecting outsider.  Prosecutions for insider dealing were rare 
because of the high evidentiary requirements to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the behaviour in question was undertaken to make 
a profit or to avoid a loss.  Although the possibility existed for civil 
remedies for insider dealing on the basis of constructive trusteeship, 
fiduciary accountability or breach of confidence, it was generally 
accepted that no comprehensive regime for civil liability was availability 
for those investors who had suffered a diminution in value of their 
securities as a result of dealing on the basis on inside information.  The 
Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (FSMA)
54 represents an 
important extension of the powers currently available to regulators to 
combat market abuse and insider dealing.  The UK’s position as a 
leading international financial centre depends not only on the openness 
and competitiveness of its markets but also on its reputation as clean and 
fair place to do business.  Market confidence will be undermined where 
participants and users believe markets are susceptible to abuse.  This 
reduction in market confidence will impair market efficiency, thus 
disadvantaging market participants.  To this end, section 118 of FSMA 
defines and prohibits market abuse.  In addition, section 123 (1)(b) 
creates a separate offence of encouraging or requiring another person to 
commit market abuse.  These offences will be discussed in turn. 
 
The Act’s legal framework complements the existing criminal offence of 
insider dealing under the Criminal Justice Act 1993.  The Act confers on 
the FSA broad powers to combat market abuse, in particular to fill the 
gap that had existed in previous legislation.  The FSA is also empowered 
  
  
to prosecute the criminal offence of market manipulation as defined 
under section 397 and the offence of insider dealing under section 402.  
Although these particular offences cover a relatively narrow range of 
very serious misconduct where there is an intention to abuse the market 
and other users, it is also recognised that market confidence, integrity 
and efficiency can also be damaged by a broader range of misconduct 
and by the effects of that misconduct on the markets.  It is this broader 
range of conduct that was not covered by previous legislation.  Such 
misconduct was only addressed by the regulatory framework (including 
the rules of the RIEs), in particular the FSA’s Principles for Business 
which required authorised firms and registered individuals to observe 
high standards of market conduct. 
 
16. What is Market Abuse? 
 
Part VIII of FSMA contains the provisions relating to market abuse and 
section 118 (1) defines the specific offence of market abuse to occur 
when a user of the market has been unreasonably disadvantaged 
(whether directly or indirectly) by others in the market who have:  (1) 
used to their own advantage information which is not generally 
available; or (2) created a false or misleading impression; or (3) 
undertook activities that distort the market. Part VIII of the Act contains 
provisions relating to market abuse.  Market abuse is defined
55 in section 
118(1) of the Act as behaviour (whether by one person alone or by two 
or more persons jointly or in concert) – 
 
(a)   which occurs in relation to qualifying investments traded 
on a market to which this section applies; 
 
(b) which satisfies any one or more of the conditions set out 
in subsection (2); and 
 
(c)   which is likely to be regarded by a regular user of that 
market which is aware of the behaviour as a failure on the 
  
  
part of the person or persons concerned to observe the 
standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in 
his or their position in relation to the market. 
 
The three conditions set forth in subsection two are:   
 
(a)    the behaviour is based on information which is not 
generally available to those using the market but which, if 
available to a regular user of the market, would or would be 
likely to be regarded by him as relevant when deciding the 
terms on which transactions in investments of the kind in 
question should be effected; 
 
(b) the behaviour is likely to give a regular user of the market 
a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, or 
demand for, or as to the price or value of, investments of the 
kind in question; 
 
(c)   a regular user of the market would, or would be likely to, 
regard the behaviour as behaviour which would, or would be 
likely to, distort the market in investments of the kind in 
question. 
 
Based on the above language, three tests must be satisfied in order to 
determine whether behaviour is market abuse: (1) that the behaviour 
must occur in connection with a qualifying investment traded on a 
prescribed market (i.e. recognised investment exchange); (2) one or 
more of the following: ‘misuse of information’, ‘false or misleading 
impressions’, or ‘market distortion’; and (3) the behaviour must fall 
below the standard of behaviour that a regular user of the market would 
reasonably expect of a person in the position of the person in question.  
Behaviour will amount to market abuse only if it satisfies all three these 
tests.  The FSA considers these descriptions to cover behaviour which, 
in its view, constitutes market abuse.  Therefore, for such behaviour to 
  
  
be considered market abuse, it must correspond to one of these three 
elements and be likely to be regarded by a regular user of the market as a 
failure on the part of the person or persons concerned to observe the 
standard of conduct reasonably expected of a person in his or their 
position in relation to the market.        
 
 
17. The Code of Market Conduct’s Definition of Market Abuse 
 
Section 119 of FSMA requires the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
to issue a Code of Market Conduct (the Code) that provides guidance for 
determining whether behaviour amounts to market abuse.
56  The Code 
sets out in more detail the standards that should be observed by everyone 
who uses the markets.  Section of FSMA defines three broad categories 
of behaviour which may amount to market abuse: misuse of information 
that is not generally available to users of the market; the dissemination 
of false or misleading information; and market distortion.
57  The Code 
defines these categories of behaviour in more specific terms.  Misuse of 
information is similar to the insider dealing offence because it involves 
behaviour (action or inaction) that is based on information which is not 
generally available but which would be relevant to an investor’s dealings 
in a particular investment and which is ordinarily disclosed to the 
market.  For example, a person who learns from a friend that the friend’s 
spouse’s company is about to be the subject of a takeover would commit 
misuse of information if the person buys shares in the spouse’s company 
in anticipation of making a profit on the rise in the share price once the 
takeover is announced.      
 
The second category is the creation of false or misleading impressions.  
This is behaviour likely to give rise to a false or misleading impression 
as to the supply or demand, price or value of an investment.  The FSA 
has used the example of internet bulletin boards, where messages can be 
posted outlining the benefits of a number of investments.  This can be a 
source of market manipulation if they contain false or misleading 
  
  
statements about a companies’ activities or profitability. For example, an 
individual who buys shares in a company, then posts untrue messages 
and afterwards, when unwary investors buy the shares (driving the price 
higher), sells at a profit, thus leading the price to collapse. This is known 
as a ‘pump and dump’ scheme, which often leads innocent investors to 
lose money on their investment. 
    
The third category is ‘distorting the market’ which involves behaviour 
that interferes with the normal process of supply and demand, and 
therefore manipulates the market price of an investment. This would 
involve a person buying large amounts of a particular share near the end 
of the day with the purpose pushing the stock price higher to improve 
investor performance. Because the market price is driven to a distorted 
level, investors receive a false impression of the share price or the value 
of any portfolio or fund which holds that stock. Investors are thus 
encouraged to make the wrong investment decisions.  
    
These three categories of market abuse will have the effect of reducing 
confidence in the market and impairing its efficiency. Under the statute, 
market confidence will be undermined if markets user feel unreasonably 
disadvantaged – either directly or indirectly – by others in the market 
who have used to their own advantage information which is not 
generally available,  created a false or misleading impression, or 
distorted the markets.   
    
18. The Effect of the Market Abuse Regime? 
 
The Act’s market abuse regime extends the current regulatory scheme in 
two important respects: (1) extends its scope of coverage to unauthorised 
persons as well as to authorised persons; and (2) introduces greater 
transparency and clarity in the area of market conduct than was currently 
available to the regulated community. The insider dealing provisions of 
the Act are significant because they apply not only to authorised 
persons, but also to all those who deal in investments traded on certain 
  
  
prescribed markets. These prescribed markets are expected to be those 
operated by the seven UK recognised investment exchanges (RIEs).   
With respect to clarity and transparency, the Act requires the FSA to 
publish a Code of Market Conduct (‘the Code’) to supplement the 
statutory provisions defining market abuse and insider dealing in the 
Act. The Code is intended to give guidance to those who may determine 
whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse, as required by the 
Act. This section will analyse the three main elements of the new market 
abuse and insider dealing regime, that is, the misuse of relevant 
information that is not generally available to other market users, the 
giving of false or misleading impressions, and market distortion.   
 
The Market Abuse Regime covers both unauthorised and authorised 
persons and, through the Code, introduces greater transparency and 
clarity than existed under the previous legislation and regulations in 
determining what behaviour is acceptable or not. It is intended that those 
who use the markets will have a clear benchmark against which to 
measure their standards of behaviour. The benchmark is based in market 
standards that were developed through the consultation process and 
through the ‘regular user’ test. The ‘regular user’ test is an essential 
element in the definition of market abuse and will be discussed below.      
 
19. Regular User Test 
 
The definition of the term ‘regular user’ plays an essential role in 
defining ‘market abuse’. Market abuse is defined in reference to 
standards of behaviour that a regular user would reasonably expect of a 
person in the position of a person concerned. A regular user is defined in 
section 118(10) of the Act as ‘in relation to a particular market, a 
reasonable person who regularly deals on that market in investments of 
the kind in question’. The Code describes how the FSA will apply the 
‘regular user’ test by making clear that the ‘regular user’ is, in legal 
terms, a hypothetical user of the market, rather than a particular or actual 
user. Behaviour will not, therefore, amount to market abuse unless it 
  
  
falls short of the standards of behaviour which the hypothetical regular 
user of the market in investments of the kind in question would be likely 
reasonably to expect from a person in the position of the person 
concerned; that is, unless the behaviour in question falls short of 
acceptable standards of behaviour in the particular context.      
 
In addition, the Code recognises that, although the actual standards of 
conduct which prevail in a particular market at a particular time are 
relevant to the decision as to whether conduct meets or falls short of the 
standards expected by the regular user, these standards are not defined 
by the Code. The rationale is that there may be occasions when regular 
users of the market may not deem the standards which are acceptable by 
actual users of the market to be objectively acceptable. This may occur 
in a situation where the actual user of a market would tolerate the misuse 
of information, whereas the objective reasonable regular user would not 
find such behaviour acceptable.   
 
Although the regular user test is based on a hypothetical user, it will not 
operate in a vacuum, unaffected by the standards that do prevail in 
markets. The regular user will take into account compliance with the 
rules of a RIE or other rules or codes of conduct and good practice when 
deciding whether behaviour amounts to market abuse because it falls 
short of reasonably expected standards. Moreover, the rules of a RIE 
will include the rules and standards of overseas markets when conduct 
on those markets is relevant to determining whether or not there has 
been an abuse of the standards of a prescribed UK market. Similarly, it 
should also be pointed out that there may be consequences for market 
participants who operate in different national markets where standards of 
conduct may vary across different national markets. Specifically, it is 
possible that conduct which is tolerated in one jurisdiction may be 
considered as behaviour which amounts to market abuse if that 
behaviour has an adverse effect on a UK prescribed market. The Code 
recognises that the local rules, practices, and conventions prevailing in a 
non-UK market will be an important factor in determining the standards 
  
  
that the regular user will expect of a person dealing from that market 
onto a prescribed market. However, compliance with local rules will not 
automatically insulate a market user from liability since such conduct 
may still fall below the standards expected by the regular user.  An 
analogy can be provided by the FSA’s Price Stabilising Rules
58, which 
will only recognise non-UK financial authorities’ stabilisation rules if 
they provide broadly equivalent protection to the FSA’s rules. Where 
such foreign stabilisation rules provide equivalent protection, a person’s 
compliance with those rules entitles it to benefit from a safe harbour; but 
where such foreign rules do not provide similar protections, then there is 
no safe harbour protection.      
 
The FSA has stated, as a general proposition, that ‘normal market 
practices’ will not amount to market abuse, provided that the behaviour 
in question meets the standards reasonably expected by the reasonable 
user. There may be circumstances, however, when it becomes clear that, 
although a market, or class of users in a market, accepts a particular 
practice, that practice may still not rise to the standard reasonably 
expected by the regular user, as defined in the Act. The FSA does not 
expect such circumstances to arise frequently, but it should be noted that 
such a case arose in 1991 concerning trading in property futures 
contracts on the London FOX market.  In this case, the Securities and 
Futures Authority (SFA) took disciplinary action against five firms 
which admitted carrying out transactions for the purpose of creating a 
false appearance of increased activity and liquidity in property futures 
contracts.  Moreover, senior officials of the London FOX (which was, at 
the time, a RIE) directed and encouraged that such transactions be 
carried out.  This is an example of conduct that was accepted by market 
participants and senior officials of the exchange but which fell beneath 
the standards that were acceptable to the regular user.







The focus of the market abuse regime remains centred on the effects of 
behaviour, and not on the intentions behind such behaviour. 
Accordingly, to impose civil liability, it is not necessary for any 
intention or purpose to be demonstrated in order for the regular user to 
conclude that behaviour amounts to market abuse. Notwithstanding, 
there will be some situations where the purpose of the person 
responsible for the behaviour will be relevant to the regular user’s 
conclusions as to whether the behaviour falls below that of expected 
standards.  In order to determine acceptable standards of behaviour for a 
person, the regular user must take into account that person’s position in 
relation to the market. The Code prescribes no universal standard.   
Rather, the standards expected of the regular user will vary according to, 
inter alia, a person’s skill, level of knowledge and experience. For 
example, the standards expected of a professional market participant will 
be more demanding in many instances than those of a retail investor who 
trades infrequently. Because the Code does not seek to set forth the 
standards of behaviour expected for every conceivable type of market 
participant, the FSA has determined that it will apply the appropriate 
differentiation on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The FSA has stated that it will assess behaviour in the light of the 
circumstances which applied at the time of the transaction. There will 
likely be cases where, with the benefit of hindsight, conduct that was 
previously accepted in a particular market becomes regarded as market 
abuse. If the behaviour was reasonable at the time, however, taking 
account of all circumstances, then the regular user will not consider the 
person as having engaged in market abuse at that time.   
 
20.  The Prescribed Markets and Qualifying Investments Order 
 
The market abuse regime applies to behaviour in connection with 
qualifying investments traded on a market to which section 118 will 
apply. The HM Treasury has the power to prescribe the markets to 
which section 118 will apply and the investments which are qualifying 
  
  
investments in relation to those markets. The Prescribed Markets and 
Qualifying Investments Order specifies which investments and markets 
will be subject to the statute.  Article 2 of the Order prescribes the 
markets to which section 118 will apply as any market established under 
the rules of the UK RIEs. These UK RIEs include: the London Stock 
Exchange Ltd, London International Financial Futures and Options 
Exchange Administration and Management, the London Metal 
Exchange Ltd, the International Petroleum Exchange of London Ltd, 
OM London Exchange Limited and Tradepoint Stock Exchange. Article 
3 of the draft Order prescribes as qualifying investments any investment 
of a kind which, at the time the Order is made, is admitted to trading 
under the rules of any of the prescribed markets.  
 
21. The Encouraging or Requiring Offence 
 
The FSMA also prohibits those persons who encourage or require others 
to engage in market abuse. Indeed, section 123 (1)(b) creates a separate 
offence of requiring or encouraging another person to commit market 
abuse by authorising the FSA to impose a penalty on a person if it is 
satisfied that that person, by taking or refraining from taking any action, 
has required or encouraged another person or persons to engage in 
behaviour which, if engaged in by the encourager, would amount to 
market abuse. To commit this offence, section 123 (1)(b) requires the 
following to be shown: (a) that the behaviour would have amounted to 
market abuse if carried out by the person who requires or encourages; 
and (b) that the person, by action or inaction, required or encouraged 
another to engage in the behaviour in question.
60    
 
The purpose of section 123 (1)(b) is to prevent persons from 
circumventing the market abuse prohibition by prohibiting behaviour 
that encourages or requires other persons to engage in market abuse. It is 
not necessary to show that the person who encouraged or required has in 
fact benefited from the action of the person who was required or 
encouraged to commit the conduct in question.
61 The FSA is authorised 
  
  
to undertake a civil and/or criminal enforcement action against persons 
who breach the encouragement or requirement standard. The FSA will 
likely apply a test that assesses whether the conduct undertaken by the 
person who was encouraged or required amounts to market abuse and 
whether such conduct would also have amounted to market abuse if 
committed by the person who purportedly did the encouraging or 
requiring.     
 
Under section 123 (1)(b) of FSMA, the FSA may determine if the 
behaviour of another person amounts to market abuse if such behaviour 
had been engaged in by the encourager. In deciding this question, the 
FSA will apply the general principles set out in the Code of Market 
Conduct (‘Code’).
62 The Code provides guidance to the extent that in 
determining whether a person’s behaviour falls short of expected 
standards (so that it would have amounted to market abuse if engaged by 
that person), consideration will be given to the knowledge, skill and 
experience to be expected of a person in the position of the alleged 
encourager. This is an objective reasonable person standard to be applied 
to the person whose conduct has allegedly encouraged or required 
another to undertake conduct that amounts to market abuse as defined in 
the statute and the Code.     
 
The Code also provides that whether a person’s taking or refraining from 
taking action might be regarded as requiring or encouraging others will 
depend on circumstances such as acceptable market practices, the 
expertise of the person concerned, and the control or influence the 
person has in relation to the person who engages in the behaviour in 
question. In the case of intermediaries, the primary focus will be on the 
originator of any abusive behaviour or transaction, including when the 
originator uses an intermediary to execute the transaction. For example, 
the mere execution of a customer’s order by an intermediary will not 
result in liability for requiring or encouraging the customer to engage in 
behaviour which amounts to market abuse if the contact between the 
  
  
intermediary and the customer is limited to the placing of the order with 
no indication that the transaction in question is an abusive transaction.  
  
There may be circumstances, however, in which an intermediary 
executes a transaction when it knows, or has reason to know based on an 
objective standard, that the effect of the transaction on the market will be 
to abuse the market and allows the transaction to proceed.
63  Under these 
circumstances, the intermediary’s behaviour will amount to market 
abuse under section 118 of FSMA, but liability will not be based on the 
intermediary  requiring or encouraging the customer to engage in 
abusive behaviour. To demonstrate liability in this context, it will be 
necessary to show that the intermediary failed to observe the standard of 
behaviour reasonably expected of a person in the intermediary’s 
position. The relevant considerations for determining this will be, inter 
alia, the extent to which the intermediary had followed the rules of the 
relevant recognised investment exchange, and the extent to which the 
intermediary had made (or should have made) some assessment of the 
abusive nature of the customer’s behaviour.     
 
The Code of Market Conduct discusses several examples in which a 
person may require or encourage another person to engage in behaviour 
which, if engaged in by the former, would amount to market abuse.  The 
Code provides some examples where liability might arise under section 
123 (b)(1).   
 
Examples:  
a company director who is in possession of information which is 
both relevant and disclosable (other than trading information) and 
which is not generally available to market users, instructs a 
company employee to deal in qualifying investments or relevant 





If A recommends or advises B to engage in behaviour which, if 
engaged in by A, would amount to market abuse, or if A seeks to 
persuade or otherwise entice B to engage in such behaviour. 
 
FSA consultation paper 59 specified an example of employer liability 
arising where the employer is aware that one of its employees, or any 
other person under its authority or control, is engaged in market abuse, 
and then permits that person to continue to engage in the relevant 
behaviour.
64 After consultation, however, the FSA did not list this type 
of employer liability in its list of examples in consultation paper 76, thus 
providing no guidance for employers in this area. Another important 
issue not addressed by the FSA in its consultation papers concerns the 
issue of vicarious liability, or respondeat superior, for an employer 
whose employees or agents commit market abuse whilst performing 
within the course and scope of their responsibilities. These issues of 
employer liability should be clarified.       
  
In considering whether a person’s behaviour falls below certain 
standards of conduct with respect to market abuse, it will be necessary to 
inquire as to the knowledge, skill, and experience of not only the person 
who actually committed the offence, but also the person who is alleged 
to have required or encouraged the offence. Another important factor in 
determining whether the person taking or refraining to take action might 
be regarded as requiring or encouraging others will depend on 
circumstances (e.g. acceptable market practices), the expertise of the 
person concerned, and the control or influence the person has in relation 
to the person who has engaged in the misconduct. Unlawful requiring or 
encouraging may also occur where a person disclosed information which 
a regular user would expect market users to have on an equal basis, 
other than in accordance with the rules of a prescribed market, in order 
to manipulate market prices. For example, unlawful encouragement or 
requiring would occur where a potential bidder selectively disclosed 
certain information prior to dissemination of that bidder’s intention, 
  
  
except as permitted according to the rules of a prescribed market or 
recognised investment exchange.
65      
 
The FSA has stated in the Code that it will not regard a person as 
requiring or encouraging others to deal if he passes information which is 
relevant information and not generally available to the following: 
  
1) his employees (or, where appropriate, his fellow employees) for 
the purpose of enabling them to perform their functions in 
circumstances where the possession of the information in 
question is necessary for the proper performance of those 
functions; or 
2) his professional advisers, and/or the professional advisers of any 
persons involved or who may be involved in any transaction or 
takeover bid with or involving him, for the purpose of obtaining 
advice; or 
3) any person with whom he is negotiating, or intends to negotiate, 
any commercial, financial or investment transaction (including 
prospective underwriters or places of securities) for the 
purposes of facilitating the proposed transaction; or 
4) Representatives of his employees or trade unions acting on their 
behalf in fulfillment of a legal obligation; or 
5) Any government department, the Bank of England, Competition 
Commission or any other statutory or regulatory body or 
authority for the purposes of fulfilling a legal or regulatory 
obligation or otherwise in connection with the performance of 




The above list does not cover all the circumstances where liability may 
arise because of a person passing information which is relevant 
information and not generally available to the public, and the FSA will 




Regarding a takeover bid, a person will not be regarded as having 
required or encouraged another person to engage in behaviour that 
amounts to market abuse in the following circumstances:  (a) where A is 
an advisor to B, and B is an actual or potential offeror in a takeover bid; 
and (b) where A advises B to acquire an equity stake in a target 
company for the purposes and in the manner specified.
67 
 
In summary, the Act defines market abuse as the misuse of relevant 
information that is not generally available to other market users, the 
giving of false or misleading impressions, and market distortion.  The 
first element, ‘the misuse of information’, applies to behaviour based on 
information not generally available to those using the market, but which, 
if it were available to a regular user, would be regarded by him as 
relevant in making investment decisions. The rationale is that market 
users expect certain classes of information to be made available to all 
market users on an equal basis. Trading on the basis of such insider 
information will undermine confidence in the integrity of the market if 
certain market participants have access to such information before it 
becomes generally available and can trade on it to their own advantage. 
 
The second element involves behaviour which is likely to give a regular 
user a ‘false or misleading impression’ as to the supply of, or demand 
for, or price or value of investments. Market users who trade on the 
markets covered by the Act can reasonably expect to rely on the 
accuracy of certain types of information and transactions that are 
reported to the wider market. The third element of market abuse 
concerns ‘market distortion’, in which the behaviour of a person 
impeding the proper operation of market forces and the interplay of 
demand and supply would be regarded by the regular user as distorting 







22. Developments in the European Community 
 
As part of its Financial Services Action Plan, the European Commission 
has proposed a Directive on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 
(referred to as the ‘Market Abuse Directive’) that is intended to serve as 
part of a broader and more integrated European Union financial services 
and capital market. The Commission initially consulted the newly-
constituted European Securities Committee (established as part of the 
Lamfalussy Committee programme) and then was submitted as a 
‘technical’ directive to the European Parliament (as opposed to a 
‘framework’ directive).  Under the so-called ‘Lamfalussy Stockholm 
Format’, ‘technical’ directives face a streamlined procedure for approval 
in the European Parliament before being sent to the European Council.  
This streamlined form of lawmaking is considered necessary for 
regulators to respond promptly to rapid changes in financial markets, 
and will be adopted for most new legislation on financial services and 
cross-border capital movement.   
 
The Market Abuse Directive will replace the existing Directive on 
Insider Dealing
68, which applied only to the offence of insider dealing, 
and not to the wider offence of market manipulation. The proposed 
Market Abuse Directive will expand the proscribed offence to include 
both insider dealing and market manipulation, thus creating a common 
legal regime for these offences and a more harmonised EU approach for 
corporate and securities regulation. The Lamfalussy Committee proposal 
intends to establish a streamlined administrative structure at the EU level 
that would facilitate and coordinate enforcement and supervision efforts 
by national authorities and to harmonise regulatory efforts in these areas.   
 
23. Market Abuse Under the Proposed Directive   
 
The proposed Directive’s definition of market abuse falls into three 
categories. First, the use of information that is not publicly available for 
the benefit of certain persons. Second, transactions to trade or orders to 
  
  
trade that distort market conditions by giving rise, or likely to give rise, 
to false or misleading signals as to the supply, demand or price of one or 
several financial instruments, or which secure, by one or more persons 
acting in collaboration, the price of one or several financial instruments 
at an abnormal or artificial level, or which employ fictitious devices or 
any other form of deception or contrivance. Third, the creation of false 
or misleading signals through the dissemination of information in the 
media (including the internet) that is likely to affect the supply, demand 
or price of financial instruments, including the dissemination of rumours 
and false or misleading news.   
 
These definitions of market abuse are generally similar to the definitions 
of market abuse provide in section 118 of FSMA. Regarding misuse of 
information, Article 2 of the Directive restates the prohibition on insider 
dealing provided under the 1989 Insider Dealing Directive by requiring 
member states to prohibit any natural or legal person who possesses 
inside information from taking advantage of that information by 
acquiring or disposing of financial instruments to which that information 
relates, either directly or indirectly, for his own account or for the 
account of a third party. Although the prohibition on misuse of 
information in section 118 of FSMA corresponds with the Directive’s 
definition of information, its scope is narrower because it applies only to 
the civil offence of misuse of information. The UK definition is 
narrower because it applies only for the civil offence, and not as a 
criminal offence as under the Directive. Because Part V of the Criminal 
Justice Act was enacted in order to implement the 1989 Directive, UK 
law essentially complies with the requirement in Article 2.   
 
Article 1(2) however goes beyond the insider dealing offence by 
creating two categories of market abuse that could be broadly defined as 
market distortion and creating false or misleading impressions in the 
market. These two categories provide a general definition of ‘market 
manipulation’. The Directive recognises that market manipulation can 
occur in four different situations. First, trading activities intended to 
  
  
create a false impression of activity, which would include transactions 
such as ‘wash sales’ in which there is no genuine change in the actual 
ownership of the financial instrument in question. This would also apply 
to transactions where both buy and sell orders are entered at the same 
time, involving different parties who collude to maintain the same prices 
and quantity (‘improperly matched orders’). Parties are also prohibited 
from becoming involved in a series of transactions that are reported in a 
public display facility from giving impressions of price movements in a 
financial instrument (ie. ‘painting the tape’). It would also impose 
penalties on persons who act in collaboration to ‘pump-up’ the price of a 
financial instrument on a market to an artificially inflated value, and 
then immediately sell it (pump and dump).   
 
Second, trading activities intended to create a shortage, such as 
‘cornering’ or ‘abusive squeezes’, are also prohibited under the proposed 
Directive. ‘Cornering’ occurs when a person seeks to exploit a dominant 
position in a derivative or underlying asset by securing control of the bid 
or demand-side of the derivative and/or the underlying asset in order to 
manipulate its price. ‘Abusive squeezing’ occurs when a manipulator 
has a significant position in the market and then seeks to use its control 
or influence to cause a shortage and thereby to create artificial prices.   
 
Third, time specific trading activity can involve manipulation where the 
manipulator buys or sells at the close of the market in order to alter the 
closing price of the financial instrument, and thus to mislead those who 
act on the basis of closing prices. This is known as ‘marking the close’.  
A trader might also seek to manipulate the market by trading specifically 
to interfere with the spot or settlement price of derivative contracts, 
although many experts recognise it would be very difficult to prove 
this.
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Fourth, manipulative trading activity may involve the spreading of false 
rumours to induce buying or selling by others or the making of untrue 
statements of material fact. Further, what is known as ‘scalping’ may 
  
  
also breach the Directive when a person purchases a financial instrument 
for his or her own account before recommending it to others and then 
selling it at a profit after the price rises following the recommendation. 
 
In addition, Article 6 of the proposed Directive requires member states 
to impose third party liability on professional intermediaries who fail to 
refrain from entering, facilitating, or assisting transactions if it 
reasonably suspects that a transaction would be based on inside 
information or would constitute market manipulation.  Article 6 requires 
professional intermediaries to reject orders on behalf of clients if a 
reasonable person could surmise that such transactions are based on 
inside information or market manipulation. This is a controversial 
provision that places the burden for preventing market manipulation on 
third party advisers and intermediaries who actively facilitate a 
transaction. Under UK law, this third party responsibility is similar to 
that which exists for banks, financial institutions and other professionals 
regarding money laundering. Various issues will arise concerning such 
things as what constitutes reasonable suspicion of market abuse, the 
burden of proof, and imputing liability through the corporate veil to 
senior managers and directors.   
 
If the proposed Directive is approved by Parliament and Council, each 
member state will be required to implement it into its own legal system, 
and the principles of civil and criminal liability in national legal systems 
will prevail in determining the type of liability to be imposed for breach.  
It is likely that each member state would impose divergent sanctions, 
and there would be the possibility that a market abuser would be subject 
to a serious criminal penalty in one state, while being exposed to a less-
stringent fine in another. The EU has no legal competence to legislate a 
specific civil or criminal sanction in each member state. One might 
conclude that such divergent application of sanctions for breach of the 
Directive would undermine the notion of harmonisation in the European 
Community and would lead to a less effective EU regulatory system for 
financial services. A possible solution might involve linking a member 
  
  
states general obligation under EU law to adopt effective and 
proportionate sanctions to implement directives with the obligation 
under Article 14 of the proposed Directive to ensure effective 




Insider dealing is a form of misuse of information. Traditionally, UK 
law viewed the problem of misuse of market information in a very 
narrow context as it related to the fiduciary relationship between the 
company director and the shareholder. More sophisticated financial 
analysis now suggests that misuse of information (including insider 
dealing) obstructs the efficient pricing of securities (Bhattacharya & 
Daouk 1999) and should be an issue of broader concern for the investing 
public. Therefore efficient financial regulation must regulate the mode 
of disclosure of relevant price sensitive information in order to maintain 
the efficient pricing and integrity of securities markets. 
 
This paper provides a general analysis of the various legal provisions 
that seek to protect investors against insider dealing and market abuse in 
the financial markets. The two major pieces of legislation are the 
provisions against insider dealing in the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and 
the market abuse provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(‘FSMA’) 2000. The FSMA market abuse regime represents an 
important extension of the powers currently available to regulators to 
combat market abuse. To prove market abuse, the FSA need only 
demonstrate the impact of the behaviour in question on the market (the 
regular user test). Moreover, the new market abuse regime applies to all 
market participants, and not merely to authorised persons as was the 
case under the 1986 Act. The Code of Market Conduct is intended to 
provide clarity and guidance to the high level of conduct that is 
considered acceptable behaviour for the regular user of the market. The 
FSA is concerned to ensure that the Code is effective in helping address 
market abuse so as to maintain confidence in the standards of UK 
  
  




The FSA’s broad powers to undertake investigations and to impose 
unlimited fines for market abuse is expected to chasten the behaviour of 
those insiders who have frequently engaged in sharp practices and 
market distortion. The FSA will likely use these powers to focus on 
market conduct issues. Senior management of companies, directors and 
all other market participants should re-examine their procedures in 
disseminating market sensitive information in order to minimise their 
liability exposure under the new regime. 
 
In addition, the Commission of the European Communities in May 2001 
released a proposed European Communities Directive in Insider Dealing 
and Market Manipulation which, if implemented, will substitute for the 
current 1989 EU Insider Trading Directive. The proposed Directive 
contains many of the features of the 1989 Directive, including the 
rationale that those persons who trade on the basis of insider information 
have an unjustified economic advantage over other market participants, 
and that insider trading laws are necessary to enhance investor 
confidence. The proposed Directive, however, contains important 
differences from the 1989 Directive that includes its coverage not only 
of securities but also of all other financial instruments, including 
derivatives over commodities. The proposed Directive would also 
require all member states to impose criminal sanctions for insider 
trading and market manipulation on ‘any natural person or legal person’. 
The proposed Directive would likely create a significant degree of 
convergence in the regulation of market abuse and insider dealing 
throughout the European Community. It also approximates the scope of 
coverage of the new FSMA market abuse regime, despite the contention 
that the proposed Directive goes beyond the scope of coverage of UK 
law. The proposed Directive is an important step in bringing about 
convergence of European financial regulation and will enhance the 
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